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INTRODUCTION
Marcus C. Strickland Jr. was a timber farmer in Ormond Beach,
Florida. He owned 5000 acres of cypress trees on property that he
inherited from his father, who had been shot and killed during a land
dispute in the late 1940s. The trees represented an inheritance Mr.
Strickland intended to pass on to his three young children-trees as
big around as his outstretched arms, and some over 300 years old. For
a timber farmer, those trees represented $2 million worth of harvest.'
In the summer of 1998, a small lightning fire eventually grew out
of control and threatened tens of thousands of acres of land in Flagler
and Volusia Counties in Florida. Firefighters unsuccessfully at-
tempted to create fire lines through ditches or controlled burns.
Eventually, government officials and firefighters entered Mr. Strick-
land's land.2
On June 27, 1998, government workers used a bulldozer to re-
move Mr. Strickland's fence. In an attempt to create a fire line, they
bulldozed over two miles of his property, cutting trees and destroying
a dike. On July 1, firefighters set two independent fires on Mr. Strick-
land's property in another attempt to control the spread of the larger
fire. Ultimately, they failed. Mr. Strickland's entire 5000 acres of tim-
ber lay ravaged, and the income-producing timber now was nothing
more than a charred parcel of land.3
Mr. Strickland brought a suit under the Takings Clause of both
the Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution.4 Timber-
land is not covered by federal crop insurance, so compensation from
the government could be his only remedy.5 He asserted that public
officials had entered his land and destroyed his property, by bulldozer
and by deliberately-set control fires, causing millions of dollars worth
of damage. Therefore, Mr. Strickland argued, his property had been
I Maya Bell, Family Stands Tough, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 6, 1998, at All; Stacey
Singer, Clinton Calls for Tourism Boost as Fire Losses Are Tallied, SUN-SENTINEL, July 10,
1998, at 6B.
2 Initial Brief at 1-2, Strickland v, Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 922 So. 2d
1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (No. 5D05-2635).
3 Complaint at 2-5, Strickland v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., No. 02-156-
CA (Fla. Flagler County Ct. Feb. 5, 2002).
4 Strickland, 922 So. 2d at 1023.
5 Singer, supra note 1.
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taken, and compensation was due.6 But the court granted summary
judgment for the Department of Agriculture, and Mr. Strickland
appealed.
The District Court of Appeals of Florida found no sympathy for
Mr. Strickland's plight. The court cited United States Supreme Court
cases from the nineteenth century, 7 and the Department of Agricul-
ture cited English common law from the seventeenth century at oral
argument." The court noted that the privilege of necessity exempted
the government from liability, and no compensation was required. It
summarily dismissed his state and federal claims. 9
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not
"be taken for public use, without just compensation."10 Despite some
complex balancing tests in the contemporary era, clear rules still do
exist for takings law, and it should be relatively simple to determine
that the government takes property by destroying it. If private prop-
erty has been destroyed for the greater good of the public, such as a
perfectly good house destroyed to stop the spread of a fire, a compen-
sable taking has occurred and the government owes just compensa-
tion. The Supreme Court, however, has held otherwise: it has
preserved an exception for the destruction of property during cases of
necessity, and it has left landowners, including Mr. Strickland, without
compensation." The Court long ago stopped trying tojustify its ratio-
nale, instead choosing to rest simply upon Justice Holmes's statement
that this exception to the Fifth Amendment is based "as much upon
tradition as upon principle." 12 This Note will argue that neither prin-
ciple nor tradition can sustain the injustice that landowners like Mr.
Strickland have experienced. The Fifth Amendment requires com-
pensation for landowners when their property is destroyed for the
public good.
This Note first explores the history of the privilege of necessity
destruction, a common law defense that allows an individual to de-
stroy property for the public good. It analyzes the history of the ex-
ception, defining the doctrine and comparing it to the traditional
eminent domain power of the state. In Part I, this Note examines the
6 Complaint, supra note 3, at 9-11.
7 Oral Argument, Strickland, 922 So. 2d 1022 (No. 5D05-2635), video available at
mms://199.242.67.132/5dcaO6janlIoa, at 1:37:15, 1:38:55.
8 Id. at 1:58:50.
9 Strickland, 922 So. 2d at 1023-24..
10 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
11 See, e.g., Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (rejecting the plaintiffs argu-
ment that the city should be liable for destroying his home to create a fire break).
12 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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three types of necessity destruction: general public 
necessity, military
necessity, and law enforcement necessity. The 
general public neces-
sity privilege has the deepest tradition, and it is 
the source of the origi-
nal necessity destruction doctrine.'1 The Note 
relates its English legal
ancestry, its application to the Great Fire of London 
of 1666, and its
American adoption. In the area of military destruction, 
this Note ex-
plores the common law and historical background 
for the privilege.
For law enforcement destruction, the most recent 
adoption of the ne-
cessity destruction justification, the Note describes the theory 
and the
American legal history.
In Part II, this Note applies the Fifth Amendment 
to the privilege
of necessity, destruction and finds destruction 
to be compensable
within the scope of the Takings Clause. The 
Takings Clause had not
yet been adopted when the legal theories were 
created, the Clause did
not originally apply to state action, and the Clause 
was not understood
to encompass any necessity destruction exception. 
The Note then ex-
amines the conflict between the Constitution 
and the common law
exception, and it rejects the attempt to reconcile the 
two areas.
Courts have attempted to describe necessity destruction 
as some other
analogous exception to the Takings Clause, such as a 
nuisance theory,
a definition that excludes it as a taking, or an 
aspect of the police
power. These comparisons improperly shoehorn 
the necessity de-
struction privilege into some other category, 
because the privilege
cannot stand on its own.
In Part III, this Note concludes with an examination 
of the linger-
ing policy reasons behind the exception to determine 
if any justifica-
tion for the exception exists in light of contemporary 
policy concerns.
The maritime law of general average, which 
requires compensation
for property owners at sea whose property is 
destroyed in a time of
necessity, suggests that land-based property owners 
should receive sim-
ilar compensation. 14 Despite alternative policy 
concerns, "in all fair-
ness and justice," property owners should be compensated 
for
property destroyed to benefit the public. 
1 5 The text and policy of the
Takings Clause should supersede this privilege, 
and injured property
owners should receive compensation.
13 See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the seventeenth century 
English roots of the
exception).
14 See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
15 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
49 (1960).
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I. HISTORY OF THE EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has held that both the permanent 
physical
occupation of property' 6 and denial of all economically 
beneficial use
of property17 are compensable takings. The Takings 
Clause exists "to
bar Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public
as a whole."18 These claims about the Takings Clause, 
however, have
not been applied to the privilege of necessity.
The common law defense of public necessity 
allows the destruc-
tion of private property for the public good. 
The person destroying
the property need not be a government official 
or the actual property
owner. The law gives the property owner no recourse 
and requires no
compensation. It makes the common public good the 
supreme law,
and it trumps the rights of the individual property 
owner.
19
Three primary types of necessity destruction 
exist. First, an indi-
vidual may destroy property to prevent the spread 
of a natural disas-
ter, usually a fire, flood, or epidemic.
20 For instance, an individual
may tear down an untouched house to create a 
firebreak. Second, the
government may destroy property in 
times of necessity during war.
21
Under this privilege, the army can destroy privately 
owned kegs of
flour to prevent the approaching enemy from 
using them. Third, the
government may destroy property in times of necessity 
during law en-
forcement, such as burning down a home to 
capture a barricaded
criminal. 2
In the latter two examples, the government has 
the exclusive au-
thority to exercise necessity destruction; in the 
former, either public
or private individuals may destroy the property. 
The English common
law allowed this privilege for a variety of policy 
reasons, predomi-
nantly because the sovereign could take property 
without compensat-
ing the injured property owner anyway.
2" Additionally, the privilege
extended because of the idea that necessity should 
be treated differ-
ently from other situations. The privilege has 
thrived under the Latin
maxim salus populi suprema lex, the health of the 
people is the supreme
16 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
17 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 
(1992).
18 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
19 See infra Part I.A.4.
20 See infra Part I.A.
21 See infra Part I.B.
22 See infra Part I.C.
23 See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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law. 24 In the realm of destruction of property for a public use, max-
ims and history have trumped the text of Takings Clause.
Indeed, courts have readily applied the Takings Clause in a vari-
ety of other circumstances where the government takes or uses prop-
erty. The government's exercise of eminent domain is a taking under
the Fifth Amendment. Eminent domain is "It] he inherent power of a
governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and
convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the
taking. ' 25 When the government takes property without eminent do-
main, the property owner can bring an inverse condemnation pro-
ceeding against the government. 2 6 Formal proceedings are not a
prerequisite for a taking. Though "eminent domain" does not appear
in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has determined that it is "'an
incident of federal sovereignty and an offspring of political neces-
sity.'" 2 7 Additionally, physical invasions of land are takings that re-
quire compensation. 28
Despite the Court's own use of the term "necessity" to describe
eminent domain, public necessity is a distinct area of the law in the
conversion of property. Public necessity is "[a] necessity that involves
the public interest and thus completely excuses the defendant's liabil-
ity."29 The use of the term has been applied inconsistently to three
areas of law where converted property need not be compensated: de-
struction for public necessity, necessity destruction during war, and
necessity destruction during law enforcement.
A. Public Necessity
1. Generally
The common law allowed any citizen to destroy property for the
public use in a time of urgent necessity.30 Commentators have gone
so far as to state explicitly, "The destruction of private property to
prevent the spread of conflagration is not a 'taking of private property
24 See, e.g., Mayor of N.Y. v, Lord, 17 Wend. 285, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); 4JoHN
F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1632, at 2846
(5th ed. 1911);JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 87-88 (Pro-
metheus Books 1986) (1690).
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
27 BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY, supra note 25, at 562 (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.11, at 424-25 (4th ed. 1991) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
28 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
29 BLACK'S LAW DIcrTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1059.
30 DILLON, supra note 24, § 1632, at 2846.
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for public use,' entitling the owner to compensation from the city."'
The privilege has long existed at common law, usually for the preven-
tion of disaster. It is most frequently applied to fire but has also ex-
tended to other disasters, including flooding and epidemic.- 2
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states, "One is privileged to
enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasona-
bly believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an immi-
nent public disaster."33  Conversion is also permitted: "One is
privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a
chattel or a conversion if the act is or is reasonably believed to be
necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public disaster."3 4 In tort law,
the privilege benefits the public in times of emergency, embodying
the maxim salus populi suprema lex.
Necessity exists for both the good of the public and the good of
the private individual. If an individual converts or destroys property
for the good of a single person, either for herself or for a third party,
then she is liable for the damage caused.3 5 The compensation re-
quirement for private benefits makes sense: an individual should not
be able to swap property arbitrarily, regardless of the relative value.
The conversion looks like theft; however, the law concedes that in
cases of extreme necessity, the individual is privileged to act where she
reasonably believes she needs to act to protect herself or a third party.
The Restatement, though, offers little solace for the private prop-
erty owner whose property is converted and destroyed for the public
good. Armstrong v. United States36 undisputedly explains the rationale
for the Takings Clause, stating that it was "designed to bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." - 7
The Restatement admits that although the "moral obligation" to com-
pensate "is obviously very great," municipal actors have generally been
immune from suits of trespass."" Furthermore, the Restatement does
31 Id. at n.1 (emphasis omitted).
32 1 NIc-oLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.43(1), at 841 (Julius L. Sackman et al. eds.,
3d rev. ed. 2006).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965). Whether a disaster is "immi-
nent" is a question to which the courts have generally afforded great deference to the
actor. So long as the individual acts reasonably, even if the disaster was not imminent,
the court would privilege the actor unless he had been negligent.
34 Id. § 262.
35 Id. § 197(2). The individual, however, will not be liable if the conversion is
caused by the possessor's tortious conduct or contributory negligence.
36 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
37 Id. at 49.
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. h (1965).
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not address whether municipalities ought to be held liable for the de-
struction of property.3 9
The history of necessity destruction privilege began in the En-
glish common law,40 with the preeminent example of the Great Fire
of London of 1666 as a primary justification for the policy behind it.
American case law has largely followed the English history, even
though the Fifth Amendment severely deviated from common law tak-
ings jurisprudence. 41
2. English History
Two English cases in the early seventeenth century are hallmarks
for the privilege of public necessity. First, The Case of the King's Preroga-
tive in Saltpetre12 in 1606 involved a citizen bringing suit against the
Crown for saltpeter taken from his land. The king took the saltpeter
for the benefit of the entire kingdom, but did not claim exclusive pos-
session of the remaining saltpeter or any interest beyond the saltpeter
necessary for the defense of the kingdom.43
The court did not rest upon the war as justification for the neces-
sity, though the king sought the saltpeter to make gunpowder. The
court emphasized that "every man may come upon my land for the
defence of the realm." 44 Therefore, the privilege was not limited to
the sovereign but was extended to anyone who acted for the public
good. Furthermore, the court noted that "every one hath benefit by
it," and that "for the commonwealth, a man shall suffer damage." 45
The court analogized the situation of destruction to prevent the
spread of a fire, or for war strategy. 46 The court here conflated the
right of the sovereign to enter land and take property with the private
individual's privilege of public necessity. The discussion, however,
may have taken place because parliament could grant a right of com-
pensation, and the king instead tried to argue that liability could not
exist for a privilege that any man may exercise. 47 Under the necessity
privilege, the court permitted the king to take saltpeter from private
39 Id. § 262 cmt. d.
40 See infra Part I.A.2.
41 See infra notes 150-62 and accompanying text,
42 (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (KB.) (decided in December of the fourth regnal
year of James 1, which some sources identify as 1607).
43 Id. at 1295.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See MONSIEUR DE VAT'rEL, THE LAW Or NATIONS 402 n.181 (photo. reprint
2005) (Joseph Chitty ed., 1854).
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property, because the production of gunpowder benefited the de-
fense of the entire nation.41 The court found that the privilege ap-
plied and was not exclusive to the sovereign. Therefore, no
compensation was due.
The second case was Mouse's Case,49 decided two years later.
Mouse, a barge passenger, lost cargo when it was jettisoned during a
violent storm on the way to London.50 Various passengers jettisoned
the cargo, and the court refused to hold any of them liable because
their actions were necessary to save the forty-seven passengers on the
barge. 51 While the court considered the possibility of compensation
from maritime law, 52 it refused to hold any individual passenger or
the owner of the ship liable. The court reasoned that because "the
danger accrued only by the act of God... everyone ought to bear his
loss for the safeguard and life of a man."53 The comparison to the
"plucking down of a house, in time of fire" again lent to the applica-
tion of the necessity exception.5 4
The rationale in these two cases was generally adopted in the
United States. 55 Interestingly, though neither case concerns destruc-
tion to prevent a fire, both cases refer to fire, and American courts
have used the privilege almost exclusively for that situation. The his-
tory behind the Great Fire of London of 1666 also influenced Ameri-
can jurisprudence, because that tale allegedly offered a historic
justification to preserve this privilege.
3. The Great Fire
In the 1788 case of Respublica v. Sparhawk,56 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court defended the doctrine of necessity privilege through the
history of the London Fire from the preeminent narrative of the Earl
of Clarendon. The court described "a memorable instance of folly,"
because the mayor of London refused to tear down houses for fear of
being financially liable to the property owners, who were attorneys. 57
The court reasoned that the law of necessity would eliminate the hesi-
48 Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1295.
49 (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.) (decided in the Michaelmas term of the sixth
regnal year of James I, which some sources identify as 1609).
50 Id. at 1341.
51 Id. at 1341-42.
52 See infra Part III.A.
53 Mouse's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1342.
54 Id.
55 See infra Part I.A,4.
56 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (Pa. 1788).
57 Id. at 363.
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tation that paralyzed the mayor of London during that fire, because a
government official would not need to worry about the compensation
due the aggrieved property owner. The history, though, has been
badly muddled and selectively reported.
The court's retelling conflicts with Clarendon's actual account.
Clarendon notes that citizens pressed the mayor to tear down houses
and create a firebreak, and adds parenthetically that "the doing
whereof at that Time might probably have prevented much of the Mis-
chief that succeeded," 58 without the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
embellished statement that "half that great city was burnt"59 because
of the delay.60 The narrative in Sparhawk does not rely on the factual
history of Clarendon, but instead presents an inflated picture of
events that justified the court's conclusion.
Diarist Samuel Pepys 'agreed with Clarendon, writing that men
were initially paralyzed and did not attempt to stop the fire.61 Pepys
received word just hours after the fire began September 2, and imme-
diately went to the king, who "commanded me to go to my Lord
Mayor from him, and command him to spare no houses, but to pull
down before the fire every way."'62 The very same day, however, Pepys
recalls that the mayor had been tearing down houses all day: "To the
King's message [the mayor] cried, like a fainting woman, 'Lord! what
can I do? I am spent: people will not obey me, I have been pulling down
houses; but the fire overtakes us faster than we can do it.'" 6 3 The futility of
tearing down houses also appears certain in Pepys's account, because
58 3 EDWARD EARL OF CLARENDON, THE CONTINUATION OF THE LIFE OF EDWARD
EARL OF CLARENDON 674 (Oxford, Clarendon Printing House, 1759) (emphasis
added).
59 Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dall.) at 363,
60 This embellishment is among the most egregious of the Sparhawk court. The
now-forgotten history of Clarendon then indicates that the mayor refused to tear
down houses because "that He durst not do it without the Consent of the Owners."
CLARENDON, supra note 58, at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted) (spelling mod-
ernized). The text does not claim that it was because the lawyers' property was in
peril, but instead that the lawyers agreed with the legal analysis of the mayor. Id. The
very next day after the fire began, however, Clarendon writes that "the Fire was too
ravenous to be extinguished with such Quantities of Water as those Instruments could
apply to it, and fastened still upon new Materials before it had destroyed the old. And
though it raged furiously all that Day, to that Degree that all Men stood amazed, as
Spectators only .. " Id. at 660-61. The simplistic assertion that the mayor may have
stopped the fire through speedy action is dubious, because the morning after the
mayor's alleged inaction, the fire had become insatiable,
61 5 THE DiRy OF SAMUEL PEPns 393 (Henry B. Wheatley ed., G. Bell & Sons
1946) (1665).
62 Id. at 393-94.
63 Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
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he describes houses at least six away from each other catching on fire,
which would require a tremendous fire break well in advance of the
progressing flame., 4 Pepys notes that even though the mayor was not
at fault for the fire, "[p]eople do all the world over cry out of the
simplicity of my Lord Mayor in general; and more particularly in this
business of the fire, laying it all upon him. ' 65 The London Gazette's
own report of the episode closely imitates Pepys, emphasizing repeat-
edly that homes were torn down, describing that the fire was unstop-
pable, and blaming only the weather for the bad fortune.63
The Great Fire of London of 1666 is an episode quickly cited in
support of the necessity privilege exception, 67 but one with disputable
history at best and false conclusions at worst. History shows that pub-
lic officials did the best they could to prevent the spread of the fire,
even though they were not given the additional incentive of the neces-
sity privilege. The mythic conception created by the Sparhawk court
that the mayor could have stopped the fire with a necessity privilege
doctrine is too much conclusion and too little fact. American courts,
however, have continued to use this conclusion and its English legal
predecessors to defend the privilege.
4. American History
The first prominent American case to address the privilege of pri-
vate necessity was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sparhawk, which
took place in 1788 well before the idea of compensation for destruc-
tion had swept many constitutions.68 Sparhawk brought the privilege
of public necessity into the American legal corpus. The facts did not
ostensibly implicate the privilege of public necessity: 227 barrels of
flour had been moved by the government to a depot in anticipation of
the invasion of British troops, who eventually took the depot and the
flour.69 The court then examined the common law history, emphasiz-
ing that "[tihe transaction, it must be remembered, happened
flagrante bello; and many things are lawful in that season, which would
not be permitted in a time of peace. ' 70 Again, despite the fact that
64 Id. at 396.
65 Id. at 405.
66 THE LONDON GAZE-rE, Sept. 3-10, 1666, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
images/ london-gazette-fire-of-london.gif.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 n.7 (1952) (quoting
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 357, 362 (Pa. 1788), and its account of the
Great Fire).
68 See infra Part II.B.
69 Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 358.
70 Id. at 362.
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the case was related to war and not to a natural disaster like a fire, the
court placed its emphasis upon the unique circumstances that would
permit the privilege of necessity.
The coui-t carefully distinguished the seizure of property that
would be a trespass from the "rule . . . that it is better to suffer a
private mischief, than a public inconvenience; and the rights of necessity,
form a part of our law."'71 The opinion then specifies several cases of
necessity for the public safety: trespass to land if the road is damaged,
trespass to land if an individual is assaulted, bulwarks built on land
during war, and the situation in the present case. 72 The first example
is taken directly from Blackstone, 73 and the rest from various English
common law sources.74 The court then enumerated several other ex-
ceptions: use of the banks of navigable waterways for towing; pursuit
of noxious foxes across private property; disruption of consensual
fighting, even when the fight takes place in a private home; and de-
struction of houses to prevent the spread of fire. 75 Again, the court
refers to a series of English common law treatises, referring in the
final instance to the Great Fire of London of 1666.76
After tracing the numerous instances where necessity justifies ac-
tion "for the public good," the court concluded:
Congress might lawfully direct the removal of any articles that were
necessary to the maintenance of the Continental army, or useful to
the enemy, and in danger of falling into their hands; for they were
vested with the powers of peace and war, to which this was a natural
and necessary incident: And, having done it lawfully, there is noth-
ing in the circumstances of the case, which, we think, entitles the
Appellant to a compensation for the consequent loss.77
The privilege became "well settled common law," even before the pas-
sage of any constitutions, when taking place "in cases of actual neces-
sity,-as that of preventing the spread of fire,-the ravages of a
pestilence, or any other great calamity.. . . -7" Even though the case
took place before the Takings Clause had even been proposed, public
necessity would be used in the future to shield the government from
liability.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 363.
73 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *36.
74 Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 363.
75 Id.
76 See supra Part I.A.3.
77 Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dali.) at 363.
78 FORTUNATUS DWARRiS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 444 (Platt Potter ed.,
Albany, William Gould & Son 1885).
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Sparhawk, however, may have overextended itself in lumping 
ne-
cessity destruction with these other general categories 
of necessity. For
instance, some of the situations mentioned are not 
as urgent cases of
necessity as the court suggests: the need to use the 
banks of navigable
waterways or to hunt foxes seems rather small. 
Instead, the court re-
lies upon the "public good" rather than any urgent 
need. Addition-
ally, many exceptions conflate distinct areas of 
law. Laws about
fighting, the title of beach fronts, and animal control 
may not necessa-
rily find their strongest defenders 
in the law of public necessity.
79
Finally, the loss created by most of these cases is de 
minimis, partic-
ularly when compared to the loss or the complete 
destruction of pri-
vate property. Most of the exceptions allow trespass 
to land, which
would result in little more than nominal compensation. 
Good policy
would presumably forbid punitive damages for 
trespass in cases of ne-
cessity, because the trespass would not implicate 
the policy concerns
that usually trouble courts.
0
Despite these policy arguments, states followed 
Sparhawk and
adopted the English common law. The first significant 
decisions re-
flecting the policy of necessity came in a series 
of New Jersey cases
about property destroyed in an 1835 fire in New 
York.8 1 State actors
destroyed a print shop and all the goods within 
it to prevent a fire
from spreading.82 The parties hotly disputed whether 
a statute ena-
bled the state officials to tear down buildings in 
a time of fire, but the
court emphasized that necessity, not a statute, authorized 
the destruc-
tion.8 3 The court distinguished between the taking 
of property that
was an "attribute of sovereignty" and within the 
scope of the constitu-
tion, and the taking of property that was the right 
of any individual
who acted in a time of necessity.
8 4
79 Moreover, today's view of foxes has presumably 
improved since cases like Pier-
son v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
80 See, e.g.,Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 
Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 164-65 (Wis. 1997).
81 Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 
248 (N.J. 1847), rev'd sub nom. Hale v.
Lawrence, 21 NJ.L. 714 (N.J. 1848). The case was 
reversed on the ground that the
statute was not a regulation of necessity, 
but actually a grant of eminent domain that
required compensation. Hale, 21 N.J.L. at 733-36. 
Ultimately, as explained later by
Nichols, if a state tries to add to the privilege 
of necessity, such as by expanding the
right to destroy property in times of "emergency" 
rather than just "necessity," then the
right becomes one of eminent domain and requires 
compensation. A public official,
however, acting within the normal scope of the 
privilege, is not liable to a landowner.
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 32, § 1.43(2), at 
845.
82 Am. Print Works, 21 N.J.L. at 255-56.
83 Id. at 258-59. It further admitted that the 
destruction was even a taking under
the state constitution, but not compensable. 
Id. at 256.
84 Id. at 257.
20061
[VOL. 82:1
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW"
494
After determining that necessity applied in the case, 
the court
tried to distinguish taking for public necessity from 
a taking for public
good:
They are both spoken of as grounded on necessity, and they 
doubt-
less are so. But the one is a state, the other an individual 
necessity,
though ofttimes resulting in a public or general good. The 
one is a
civil, the other a natural right. The one is founded on property 
and
is an exercise of sovereignty. The other has no connexion 
[sic]
with, or dependence upon, the one or the 
other.8 5
The court added that necessity is not for the benefit 
of the State or the
public, but for "the benefit of one, of a few, or of 
many."8 6 The rea-
soning distinguished the destruction from the kind 
authorized by the
statute in order to vindicate state liability. The definition 
of necessity
emphasized the natural right, independent of the 
state, to destruction
in such circumstances. The court overstated its 
case, because the act
of necessity may be divided into public or private, 
and the scope of the
action alters the requirement for 
compensation.87
Most importantly, the court refused to consider whether 
the stat-
ute overrode the existing common law and held the 
state liable where
it would naturally bear no liability. After all, it found 
the destruction a
taking under the constitution but refused compensation. 
Neverthe-
less, the New Jersey courts adhered to this position 
in subsequent
cases from the same episode and held that necessity 
"is essentially a
private and not a public or official right."
88s
In the years approaching the Supreme Court's 
1879 decision
Bowditch v. Boston,89 cases in Iowa
90 and Texas9 l presented prominent
examples of state courts adopting the line of reasoning 
from Mouse's
Case or Sparhawk when justifying the necessity privilege to prevent 
the
spread of a fire. State courts often invoked 
commentator John Dil-
lon's explanation: from the popular maxim salus 
populi suprema lex, he
justified an exemption from liability in "the public necessity, the 
public
good; and, therefore, if the public good did not 
require the act to be
done,-if the act was not apparently and reasonably 
necessary,-the
actors cannot justify, and would be responsible.
92 Without much de-
85 Id. at 258 (spelling modernized).
86 Id.
87 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
88 Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714, 729 (NJ. 1848) 
(reversing American Print
Works, 21 NJ.L. 248).
89 101 U.S. 16 (1879).
90 Field v. City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575, 
577 (1874).
91 Keller v. City of Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 
614, 615 (Tex. 1879).
92 DILLON, supra note 24, § 1632, at 2846.
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bate, virtually every state that confronted the issue had adopted the
common law exception despite the takings clause of each state's
constitution. 93
The last and most significant case to question necessity destruc-
tion takings was Bowditch, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
privilege. 94 The Court's jurisdiction in Bowditch, however, arose only
incidentally from the relationship of the parties in a bankruptcy dis-
pute, so the only questions presented turned on an interpretation of
state law; the Court did not examine the Fifth Amendment at all.9 5
Bowditch lost his building when firemen successfully exploded it
to prevent the approaching fire from spreading, and he sought recov-
ery only for the destroyed goods that he could have removed from the
building before the fire reached it.96 The Court cited the usual litany
of cases justifying the privilege and denying compensation to Bow-
ditch: Saltpetre, Mouse's Case, Sparhawk9 7 The case is largely unremark-
able in its defense of necessity, except that it was the first time the
United States Supreme Court had clearly enunciated the doctrine.
The Court reasoned, "At the common law every one had the right to
destroy real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to pre-
vent the spreading of a fire, and there was no responsibility on the
part of such destroyer, and no remedy for the owner."98 Even though
the Court was interpreting state law and not the federal Constitution,
the Court's articulation of this doctrine would implicate future neces-
sity jurisprudence that did relate to the Fifth Amendment.99 The
Court denied Bowditch compensation for a destruction that had ben-
efited the community, and the Fifth Amendment would be forever
interpreted through this holding.
93 The only state case to hold otherwise was Bishop & Parsons v. Mayor of Macon, 7
Ga. 200, 202 (1849).
94 Bowditch, 101 U.S. at 18-19.
95 Id. at 19.
96 Id. at 16.
97 Id. at 18-19.
98 Id. at 18.
99 Bowditch took place in 1879, eighteen years before the Takings Clause would
be incorporated against the states. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). Bowditch, however, became the ideal justification of the
necessity defense, twice cited in the watershed compensation case Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,.1029 n.16 (1992); id. at 1048 n.8 (Blackmun,j.,
dissenting).
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B. Military Necessity Destruction
The second type of necessity privilege is necessity destruction 
dur-
ing war. The necessity privilege for destruction 
during times of war
was often used interchangeably with the general 
principle of public
necessity. 100 The two principles are not identical; 
they share only the
central traits of the privilege: property may be 
destroyed in a time of
necessity for the benefit of the public good.
Regarding damage caused by the military during 
war, natural law
scholar Emer de Vattel wrote, "Such damages are 
to be made good to
the individual, who should bear only his quota 
of the loss."'1' The
English editor's reply to Vattel's comment, however, 
insisted, "It is le-
gal to take possession of these for the benefit 
of the community, and
no action lies for compensation, nor is any recoverable, 
unless given
by act of parliament."1
02 Vattel did distinguish between military acts
"done deliberately and by way of precaution," 
and military acts that
were "merely accidents,-they are misfortunes 
which chance deals out
to the proprietors on whom they happen to fall."'
0 3 He emphasized
that the latter would exhaust the public finances, 
require an "imprac-
ticable" contribution from the citizens, create "a 
thousand abuses" to
the system, and find "no end of the particulars."'
04 The problems that
would be created, he argued, outweighed the benefits 
of compensat-
ing those injured by necessity destruction.
Applied to contemporary takings jurisprudence, Vattel's analysis
remains accurate. The misfortunes of war generally 
fall upon the citi-
zens affected, and compensation for those misfortunes 
has never been
"intended by those who united to form a society."
105 Furthermore,
the incidental loss of private property when the 
army tries to protect
or regain that property has been regarded as beneficial. 
Without the
protection of the army, the private property 
would be entirely lost.
Vattel, however, did argue that the sovereign ought 
to be "equita-
ble" and "Just" to "those unhappy sufferers who 
have been ruined by
the ravages of war."106 He compared the debt 
of the state to injured
property owners as equal to that of families 
whose head had been
killed in duty.10 7 He surmised, "There are many 
debts which are con-
100 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying 
text.
101 VATrEL, supra note 47, at 402.
102 Id. at 402 n.181.
103 Id. at 402.
104 Id. at 402-03.
105 Id. at 403.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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sidered as sacred by the man who knows his duty, although they do
not afford any ground of action against him." 10° Vattel determined
that the injustice suffered by property owners triggered an obligation
from the state to compensate. The United States federal government
often has not felt so obliged.
The federal government's own analyses of the military necessity
exception during World War II held that enemy property taken or
destroyed was not compensable.109 Invoking the principles of Bow-
ditch and other natural disaster cases, the Department of Justice de-
fended the no compensation principle and argued that 'justification
may be found for the practice of destroying property within the zone
of actual military operations to prevent its falling into the hands of the
enemy or for other military purposes without payment of compensa-
tion to the owner."'1 0 Admitting that the distinction between destruc-
tion and taking was not entirely clear,' I I the Department nevertheless
clung to the public necessity language. A report from the Department
cited Justice Holmes in a Massachusetts decision:
When a healthy horse is killed by a public officer, acting under a
general statute, for fear that it should spread disease, the horse cer-
tainly would seem to be taken for public use, as truly as if it were
seized to drag an artillery wagon. The public equally appropriate it,
whatever they do with it afterwards.1 12
The Department summed up its position by distinguishing eminent
domain, which did require compensation, from other government ac-
tivities that did not use eminent domain.1 13 The necessity exception
privileged the government for destruction in war just as it had for in-
dividuals destroying property for the public good to prevent a natural
disaster.
C. Law Enforcement Necessity Destruction
The third type of necessity privilege is necessity destruction dur-
ing law enforcement. At English common law, the government as sov-
108 Id.
109 LANDS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR WAR PUR-
PosEs 78 (1944) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTiCE, ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY]; LANDS
DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 72
(1941) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T oFJUSTICE, EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY]. The govern-
ment, however, failed to make an explicit parallel holding regarding allied property
destroyed during the war.
110 U.S. DEP'T or JUSTICE, EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY, supra note 109, at 90.
IIl Id.at9l n.340.
112 Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100, 102 (Mass. 1891).
113 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY, supra note 109, at 86.
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ereign owed no compensation for any taking, destruction or
otherwise, unless parliament granted it. 14 Blackstone thought that
compensation should be due, but the English courts emphasized that,
as wise as the policy may be, it was not required. 115 Destruction
caused by the sovereign in the exercise of law enforcement would not
be compensated, and it was not protected under the "necessity" de-
fense until the late twentieth century. 116
The necessity justification for law enforcement destruction cob-
bled together a variety of theories to prevent the expansion of liability
to the state. A 1995 California case, Customer Co. v. City of Sacra-
mento, 7 exemplifies the theory promulgated. Police used tear gas to
capture a criminal who had hidden in the plaintiffs store.",
The California Supreme Court first emphasized:
Neither the "taken" nor the "or damaged" language ever has been
extended to apply outside the realm of eminent domain or public
works to impose a constitutionally-based liability, unamenable to legis-
lative regulation, for property damage incidentally caused by the ac-
tions of public employees in the pursuit of their public duties.' "1
Even though the California Constitution contained the words "or
damaged" as a circumstance beyond a "taking" that required compen-
sation, the Supreme Court of California refused to recognize recovery
in this case. It examined the history and found that the language only
applied to the traditional bounds of eminent domain. 20 It then used
the "emergency exception" doctrine as an alternative ground to ex-
plain the refusal to compensate:
The emergency exception has had a long and consistent history in
both state and federal courts. It is a specific application of the gen-
eral rule that damage to, or even destruction of, property pursuant
114 William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553,
572-88 (1972).
115 Governor & Co. of the British Cast Plate Mfrs. v. Meredith, (1792) 100 Eng.
Rep. 1306, 1307-08 (K.B.); see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
116 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
117 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995).
118 Id. at 902-04. The plaintiff failed to submit a proper federal question, and
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court presumably for this reason. Customer
Co. v. City of Sacramento, 516 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1996). According to the California
Supreme Court, the plaintiff only brought an inverse condemnation claim instead of
a tort claim, and he did not make a federal takings claim. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at
904-05, 905 n.2. The city also insisted that no federal claim was properly submitted.
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-9, Customer Co., 516 U.S.
1116 (1996) (No. 95-980), 1996 WL 33467250.
119 Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 906.
120 Id. at 906-07.
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to a valid exercise of the police power often requires no compensa-
tion under the just compensation clause. 12 1
The court's light treatment of the emergency exception assumed that
the exercise of law enforcement alone was a sufficient prerequisite for
application of the necessity doctrine, a trait heretofore unknown to
the doctrine of necessity. Historically, necessity destruction had been
grounded in policy objectives distinct from the exercise of the police
power, but California unified the two doctrines.
The court also asserted the same traditional policy concerns be-
hind the doctrine. Officers must be able to act without concern of
later liability and professional discipline.1 22 The court echoed Vattel's
concern that increased liability "would constitute a significant, un-
precedented, and unwarranted expansion of the scope of the just
compensation requirement." 2 3
Various state courts invoked similar reasoning relating to the priv-
ilege of destruction during the exercise of law enforcement. 124
Others insisted that the privilege fell under the text of the takings
clause of state constitutions. 12 -5 Whether explicit or implicit, all the
opinions struggle with the consequences of law enforcement for the
public good during a time of necessity. State courts have limited the
text of state constitutions in numerous ways: limiting takings to emi-
nent domain, distinguishing takings from the police power, or restrict-
ing the scope of the term "public use." The federal issue of takings
121 Id. at 909.
122 Id. at 910-11.
123 Id. at 911.
124 See, e.g., McCoy v. Sanders, 148 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (emphasiz-
ing that the police power is derived from necessity and "is not to be confused with the
power of eminent domain"); Ind. State Police v. May, 469 N.E.2d 1183, 1184 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding that the destruction did not amount to eminent domain but was
"the nature of tort"); Kelley v. Story County Sheriff, 611 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Iowa 2000)
(finding that the destruction in question looked more like an exercise of the police
power rather than of eminent domain); Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 42 N.E.2d
158, 160 (Ohio 1942) (finding "moral" but "no legal basis" for compensation for the
destruction of property); Sullivant v. City of Okla. City, 940 P.2d 220, 226-27 (Okla.
1997) (invoking the standards from Customer Co., 895 P.2d 900, to exclude a compen-
sation requirement for the destruction of property during the exercise of the police
power).
125 See, e.g., Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Minn.
1991) (construing the takings clause of the state constitution to require compensation
for destruction); Wallace v. City of Atlantic City, 608 A.2d 480, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992) (holding that damage committed for the public good requires com-
pensation by the public); Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1980)
(invoking the Armstrong principle of "fairness and justice" to require compensation
for destroyed property).
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has been lightly skirted or flatly ignored, and the nagging 
question of
the Fifth Amendment remains unaddressed in these 
cases where ne-
cessity has been invoked.
II. TH4E HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment has not been extended to protect 
any of
these three categories of necessity destruction. The 
Takings Clause
and the Compensation Clause, however, each offer 
reasons in their
text alone and in their historical underpinnings to 
apply the Fifth
Amendment to landowners whose property has been 
destroyed dur-
ing times of necessity. The compensation requirement 
in the Consti-
tution is therefore in conflict with the common law 
of necessity, and
courts have used the common law exception to trump 
the Compensa-
tion Clause. The nuisance exception, the definitional 
scope of a tak-
ing, and the police power have all been avenues by 
which courts have
rejected a compensation requirement for property owners. In light 
of
the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment, however, 
none of these
efforts is convincing.
A. The Takings Clause
According to the common law history, only a sovereign 
can take
property, and destruction in times of necessity is 
not a taking. The
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment supersedes 
this traditional
understanding. Common law exceptions do not 
trump the rights
guaranteed under the text of the Constitution, and 
the text effectively
supersedes the common law.
26
Furthermore, the Takings Clause is not limited 
to government
actors. In the passive voice, the Clause requires that 
no "private prop-
erty be taken for public use."'
127 The requirement "for public use" sug-
gests that this clause should apply exclusively against the 
sovereign,
because governments alone may exercise eminent 
domain. On its
face, however, the Clause is not limited to "eminent 
domain" or the
actions of the sovereign. It allows any taking "for 
public use" and re-
quires "just compensation." The plain text suggests that a private 
citi-
zen may take the private property of another and use 
it to the benefit
126 For example, sovereign immunity protected 
states from lawsuits, but the Su-
preme Court held in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793), 
that the states no
longer had that traditional privilege in certain circumstances 
after they ratified the
Constitution. Id. at 420. In response, the states ratified 
the Eleventh Amendment,
which restored their sovereign immunity in those 
circumstances.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
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of the public. 128 After all, under the privilege of public necessity,
completely apart from the Fifth Amendment, a private citizen could
convert property for the public benefit in extreme circumstances.
The text of the Clause only requires that the taking be for public use,
regardless of who takes the property, and the common law doctrine of
public necessity provides a private actor with the ability to "take" prop-
erty for the public use.
An argument from the text alone may look like a charlatan's trick
to expand the interpretation of the Takings Clause. But similar tak-
ings clauses of the era support this interpretation. While little history
exists regarding the passage of the original Takings Clause, some indi-
cates that it was not limited to eminent domain. The federal govern-
ment did not enact a federal eminent domain statute until 1888.12 9
Previously, the federal government used state law to take land, but the
Supreme Court in 1896 held that the power of eminent domain in-
hered in the federal sovereign irrespective of any other affirmative
grant.'30 If the federal government takes land without the procedural
safeguards of eminent domain, the injured property owner may file an
inverse condemnation claim against the government.' 3' The govern-
ment must pay for the property taken if the inverse condemnation
claim is successful, despite the fact that the government did not for-
mally exercise its power of eminent domain.132 Whether the federal
government took property through its own eminent domain power,
through state mechanisms, or without any formalities, the Takings
Clause required compensation for the injured property owner.
American colonies had no consistent takings principles before
the Revolution. In 1641, Massachusetts deviated from the previous
default English position of denying compensation when it provided
compensation for property if "goods should perish,"1 33 a phrase that
includes both useful and destroyed property. Vermont required com-
128 Other laws also hold that private citizens may violate public rights. For in-
stance, suits may be filed against private parties acting under color of state law for
statutory violations enforced under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000).
129 Act of Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 728, 25 Stat. 357 (repealed 2002).
130 Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499, 510 (1896).
131 United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
132 United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 464-65 (1903).
133 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUrM. L. REv. 782, 785 (1995) (quoting MAss. BODY OF LIBER
TIES § 8 (1641), reprinted in SoURcEs OF OUR LIBaRTis 148, 149 (Richard L. Perry &
John C. Cooper eds., 1952)).
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pensation whenever land was taken "for use of the public."' - 4 The
Massachusetts Constitution followed in 1780 with a compensation re-
quirement for takings during "public exigencies,"' 35 a phrase that en-
compasses property taken in a time of necessity. The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 also required compensation "[s]hould the public
exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation." 1 36 These
documents contradict the common law assumptions about the privi-
lege of necessity destruction, because terms embodying both destruc-
tion and necessity were codified in contemporary legislation. Courts
have also acknowledged that takings embody destruction. During the
New York fire cases, for instance, the NewJersey Supreme Court held,
"Nor is it denied that the destruction of private property for public use
is a taking of it within the meaning of the constitution."' 1- 7
Legal scholars have agreed with this definition, and even the De-
partment of Justice has admitted that the definition is at the very least
open to debate. 38 Richard Epstein aligns conversion and destruction
because they perform the same deprivation of property rights. 39 He
writes, "Surely no one would argue that the state does not take private
property when it blows up a building, or that thereafter it can con-
demn the land without paying for the building it has destroyed."' 40
Therefore, he concludes, "The eminent domain clause must apply
whether the government takes or destroys private property."' 4' Bruce
134 Id. at 790 (quoting VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. II, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CItARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3737, 3740 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909)).
135 Id. (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, part 1, art. X, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1888, 1891 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909)).
136 Id. at 791 (quoting Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. II, reprinted in SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 133, at 392, 395). Interestingly, although the Northwest
Ordinance delegated local control in the territory over issues like education, other
areas, including the requirements for takings and compensation, found no such def-
erence to local decision-making bodies. See generally LARRY P. ARNN, LIBERTY AND
LEARNINc 4-5 (2004) (discussing the delegation of authority in the Northwest Ordi-
nance, particularly in education).
137 Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 248, 256 (NJ. 1847), rev'd sub nom.
Hale v. Lawrence, 21 NJ.L. 714 (NJ. 1848) (finding that the New York statute created
a right of eminent domain instead of codifying necessity destruction).
138 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY, supra note 109, at 91
n.340.
139 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 38 (1985).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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Ackerman agrees that the plain meaning of "taking" embodies "de-
struction." 142 Property can be taken without it being given to anyone
in particular, for "if a Layman can properly use language in this way, it
follows that an Ordinary Observer will recognize a prima facie taking
not only when Layman's thing has been transferred to a third party but
when it has been utterly destroyed by the state as well."'143 The plain
meaning of the text and contemporary documents give a strong pref-
erence to include destruction within the scope of the word "taking."
If this definition of a taking is accepted, then even private individ-
uals who act on behalf of the public good fall within the scope of the
Takings Clause, and property owners should receive just compensa-
tion for their loss. Courts have carefully distinguished the privilege of
necessity from other conversions that are exclusively granted to the
sovereign. 144 The Supreme Court, however, has articulated the oft-
invoked and highly abstract principle that "[t]he Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. '145 The
principle focuses upon the harm caused to property owners rather
than the action of the government. As a dissenting justice noted in
the New York fire cases, "I cannot but think that [the destruction] ...
may well be said to be a taking for a public use. The whole city may in
turn be exposed to the same danger, and the whole city may in turn
be obliged to appeal to the same means of protection." 46 This policy
of compensating property owners who bore public burdens continued
through Armstrong and exists in the present day. 14 7
The other popular competing principle about the purpose of the
Takings Clause is that compensation for takings prevents the arbitrary
142 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 129-36
(1977).
143 Id. at 130.
144 See, e.g., 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATmsE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES § 7, at 16-17 (3d ed. 1909) ("[The privilege of private necessity) is
plainly distinguishable from the right of eminent domain. It is a right which exists in
the individual, and not in the State; by nature, and not as the result of political
organization.").
145 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
146 Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714, 748 (N.J. 1848) (Carpenter, J., dissenting).
147 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citing Arm-
strong's "fairness and justice" principle).
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deprivation of property by the government. 148 This philosophy be-
hind the takings doctrine was promulgated by St. George Tucker in
his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries.1 49 If arbitrariness were the
sole concern of the Takings Clause, then necessity privilege would not
conflict with that goal, because property would be destroyed under
times of actual necessity and therefore not for an arbitrary or capri-
cious purpose.
But if the Armstrong principle of "fairness and justice" is truly the
impetus behind the Takings Clause, then compensation should be
due regardless of the actor, so long as the actor does destroy the property
"for public use." If the arbitrariness principle is the impetus, then
compensation should be limited to occasions where arbitrariness is a
concern. The tension between the Armstrong principle and the arbi-
trariness principle is best reflected in the debate about the meaning
and application of the Compensation Clause.
B. The Compensation Clause
William Michael Treanor traces the history of the Compensation
Clause, emphasizing that the original understanding was clear on two
points: the government compensated physical takings, and the gov-
ernment did not compensate land regulation.'50 American colonies
had no consistent compensation principles before the Revolution.1 51
The colonies often adopted the standard English position of voluntary
compensation, which allowed the sovereign to take property and re-
quired no compensation, although sometimes the sovereign chose to
compensate.152 Later statutes and constitutions began to adopt a
compensation requirement.153 For instance, although improving un-
148 See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent Own-
ers' Property in the Course of Law Enforcement: The View from Five State Supreme Courts, 34
McGEORGE L. REv. 1, 17 n.166 (2002).
149 St. George Tucker, Of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
app. at 305 (photo. reprint 1969) (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (stating that the Compensation Clause "was
probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining suppli-
ers for the army"). Tucker wrote before 1795, so his comments are arguably most
authoritative on the interpretation of the Constitution. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W.
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 11-12 (2002).
150 Treanor, supra note 133, at 782.
151 See Stoebuck, supra note 114, at 579-88 (discussing the compensation require-
ments of the various colonies and their underlying principles).
152 See id. at 575-88.
153 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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improved lands traditionally did not require compensation, Vermont
altered that tradition with its constitution of 1777 by requiring com-
pensation even for improvement of unimproved property. 15 4 This his-
tory cuts against the arbitrariness principle, because the government's
improvement of land does not indicate the arbitrary taking of property.
These statutes that first adopted a compensation requirement fol-
lowed a long line of legal theorists, including Samuel Pufendorf and
William Blackstone, who defended the need for compensation' 55
Pufendorf insisted that if property were taken for public purposes, the
share that the property owner did not deserve to bear "ought to be
refunded to that citizen from the public treasury, or by contribution
of the other citizens, so far as possible."1 56 Pufendorf distinguished
between the regulation and the taking of property.' 57 He conceded,
however, that an exception may exist in times of necessity and for
damage that was "inevitable," though he did not advocate the excep-
tion. 158 He limited the principle to cases where the property owners
"tacitly confirmed" government destruction of property in advance.' 59
How to determine tacit confirmation was never discussed.
Blackstone insisted that when the government took private prop-
erty from a citizen, it should "giv[e] him a full indemnification and
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now consid-
ered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange."1 60
He argued that the legislature needed a check, because the possession
of this exclusive power was one that would unjustly harm the property
owner, who would be stripped arbitrarily of his property. 6 ' Though
Blackstone's native England did not look so kindly upon his commen-
tary,162 the Founders relied upon Blackstone and adopted a compen-
sation clause in the Bill of Rights.
154 William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695, 702-03 (1985).
155 James W. Ely, Jr., "That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:" The Fifth Amendment and
the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEcAL HiST. 1, 16-17 (1992).
156 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE OFFICtIo HOMINIS ET Cyvas JUXTA LEGEM NATURALEM
LiBi Duo (Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682), reprinted in
2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (James Brown Scott ed., 1995).
157 Id.
158 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DEJuRE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LiBin OCTO (C.H. Oldfather
& W.A. Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1934) (1688), reprinted in T-E CLAssIcs
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 156, at 1286.
159 Id.
160 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *139.
161 Id.
162 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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The Founders' theory behind the Compensation Clause remains
elusive. In theory, any process-based concerns in the government's
conversion of property should be alleviated in the "public use" restric-
tion and the enumerated powers of the federal government in Article
1.163 If arbitrariness alone were the concern, the "public use" require-
ment and the limited enumerated powers would have been sufficient
to protect property owners. 164 The Compensation Clause instead sug-
gests that when the government singles out a property owner, the loss
is borne by a single individual who cannot easily seek a remedy
through the political process, and the property owner should expect
compensation. 165 Singling out, though, is not necessarily a prerequi-
site for physical invasions. 166 A destruction of property not only meets
the singling out requirement, but it also meets the physical invasion
requirement.
Instead, the compensation principle boils down to a fairness is-
sue, and "we must say that compensation exists to insure that no more
of an individual's property rights will be taken from him than repre-
sents his just share of the cost of government.'' 67 If government con-
versions were limited to tort challenges, as many necessity destruction
claims have been limited, then the claims are subject to strict statutory
limits, the inevitable problem of sovereign immunity, and the reluc-
tance of the government to open itself to suits.168 Unfortunately, the
problems inevitable in limited statutory liability often leave property
163 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2679-80 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the "public use" requirement "allows the government to
take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the
property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever" and
that "the Government may take property only when necessary and proper to the exer-
cise of an expressly enumerated power").
164 Jed Rubenfeld wrote an influential article in the Yale LawJournal incorporating
a sort of substantive due process analysis inherent to the Takings Clause and eviscerat-
ing this historical understanding of the public use requirement. Jed Rubenfeld, Us-
ings, 102 YALE LJ. 1077, 1119-24 (1993). Because substantive due process did not
reach the Court's jurisprudence until the late nineteenth century, A. Raymond Ran-
dolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly's Draft Abortion Opinion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PtuB.
POL'Y 1035, 1046 (2006), it is unlikely that the Takings Clause necessarily involves this
anachronistic history.
165 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 38 VA. L. REv. 1333,
1344-48 (1991).
166 Id. at 1352-53 (explaining that where a physical invasion has occurred, a com-
pensable taking exists regardless of whether the property owner was singled out).
167 Stoebuck, supra note 114, at 588.
168 Levmore, supra note 165, at 1349-50.
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owners with the cost of the government's destruction of property. 6 9
Kent concedes these limitations, writing, "The remedy under the act
does not extend to allow a recovery in damages for merchandise in
the building when destroyed, and being the property of a third per-
son."170 An Iowa statute limited the scope of necessity destruction lia-
bility so that if the government acted ultra vires, it was no longer liable
under the common law exception.17 1 Case after case reflects the inad-
equacy of compensating property owners under statutory tort liability.
C. The Text of the Constitution and the Tradition of the Common Law
1. The Conflict
Once state constitutions adopted takings clauses that required
government compensation, states had to determine what to do with
the common law privilege of necessity. Theoretically, the new consti-
tutional text trumped the old common law exception, and the de-
struction required compensation. Instead, the courts recognized that
a common law exception for necessity was built into the constitutional
text and did not require compensation. The states, and later the fed-
eral government, resisted altering the old common law, apparently,
because it was simply old.
For instance, New York enacted a constitution that included a tak-
ings clause.' 72 Fortunatus Dwarris's definitive interpretation of the
new constitution, however, relied heavily on old case law that had pre-
served this exception, or cases that had reached the conclusion that
the new constitution did not supersede the old common law.' 73 Com-
mentator Platt Potter would later rely on Saltpetre and Mouse's Case,174
following Dwarris's emphasis that "our highest courts have held, that
this police power, or the law of overruling necessity, is not controlled
by this constitutional limitation." 75 Dwarris admitted that "all such
parts of the common law, &c., as are repugnant to this constitution
were abrogated," but concluded that "it is not clearly repugnant to the
169 For example, one New York statute was construed to permit compensation to
property owners for structures destroyed by the government during a New York fire,
but not for the loss of the goods inside the buildings. Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714,
733-34 (1848). Another statute was construed to limit significantly the liability of
public officials, again to exclude liability for the goods inside buildings. Russell v.
Mayor of New York, 2 Denio 461, 467-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
170 JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *339 n.b.
171 Field v. Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575, 587 (1874).
172 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7.
173 DWARmS, supra note 78, at 445-48.
174 See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
175 DwARRis, supra note 78, at 445.
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constitution; but being adopted by it, is in effect a part of it."176 He
conceded, however, that the lack of compensation was "injustice" and
should be corrected "by proper legislation."' 177
A similar tactic, though not as explicit, occurred in the applica-
tion of the Federal Takings Clause. The Takings Clause was incorpo-
rated against the states in 1896, with the Court's determination that
compensation and eminent domain were "inseparably connected with
the other."'1 78 Therefore, a taking of private property for the state, or
"under its direction for public use," requires compensation for the
injured property owner.1 79 The Court held that even though the gov-
ernment did not retain title to the property, it nevertheless owed com-
pensation for the taking. The Court embodied a principle broader
than the state's actual taking of the title, and included takings under
the state's direction. This holding is not dicta: the railroad had de-
sired property, and the city of Chicago accordingly condemned it.18O
Actions that take place under the direction of the state, which include
its authorized common law directives, fall within the scope of the Fifth
Amendment.
The landmark case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 8 was the first
case to reconcile the privilege of public necessity with the Takings
Clause. Justice Holmes uneasily made an "odd comment" in Penn-
sylvania Coal about Bowditch.'82 Pennsylvania Coal included a broad
statement about the nature of takings jurisprudence, which included
dicta that specified destruction and appropriation as identical consti-
tutional takings.' 83 Holmes, however, included a huge exception to
takings:
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional cases, like the blow-
ing up of a house to stop a conflagration, go-and if they go beyond
the general rule, whether they do not stand as much upon tradition
as upon principle.184
176 Id. at 446.
177 Id. at 449.
178 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897).
179 Id. at 241 (holding that a state taking of private property for public use without
compensation violates due process of law).
180 Id. at 230.
181 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
182 Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'Jurisprudence": The
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 656 (1996).
183 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
184 Id. at 415-16.
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Holmes admits that the force behind Bowditch is as much tradition as
principle, a bothersome concession for anyone reading the text of the
Constitution. If the Constitution can be ignored in light of preexist-
ing traditions, the rule of law is called into question.
The statement reflects more about Holmes's own judicial philoso-
phy and less about the actual text of the Constitution. Holmes stated
explicitly in Pennsylvania Coal that "[i] 11 general it is not plain that a
man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his shifting the damages to
his neighbor's shoulders."'8 5 The text of the Takings Clause applies
to property owners injured to the benefit of the public, and property
owners are so injured in emergency destruction. Robert Brauneis
notes, "Private necessity does not exempt a person from liability;
Holmes thought it was an anomaly that public necessity did."1 8 6
Holmes's judicial philosophy, however, accepted exceptions like the
privilege of public necessity under the doctrine of survivals.
Survivals are "rules that continue to exist by inertia even though
the law in general has discarded their original justifications."'1 7 Even
though Holmes did not necessarily agree with either the principle or
the application of the doctrine, he nevertheless continued to apply it
because of its long-standing history. Brauneis concludes, "Although
the public necessity doctrine persisted, other legal doctrines pointed
to the acceptance of a principle at odds with allowing 'public neces-
sity' to justify uncompensated destruction of property."98 Though
the privilege did not comport with the text or the philosophy behind
the Takings Clause, it remained as a vestige of the old common law.
Seventy years after Pennsylvania Coal, the Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council8 9 adopted Holmes's reasoning without any
analysis. The Court held that states cannot take away property rights
that never existed, and it looked to "background principles" 190 such as
nuisance law to determine whether those rights existed.19' Justice
Scalia included the necessity privilege among these built-in limitations
on property rights: "The principle 'otherwise' . . . [is] destruction of
'real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the
185 Id. at 416.
186 Brauneis, supra note 182, at 657.
187 Id. at 656.
188 Id.
189 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
190 See Glenn P. Sugameli, Threshold Statutory and Common Law Background Principles
of Property and Nuisance Law Define if There Is a Protected Property Interest, in TAKING SIDES
ON TAKINGS ISSUES § 7.1 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029).
191 Id. § 7.1(a).
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spreading of a fire' or to forestall other grave threats 
to the lives and
property of others."1 9
2 He then cited Bowditch, a pre-incorporation
case, to dismiss the application of the Takings 
Clause to analogous
destruction situations.
93 One commentary notes that California's
Customer Co. case 1 94 adopted the necessity privilege 
as a result of the
logic in Lucas, which effectively allowed states 
to carve out historic
exceptions to the text of takings statutes.
1 95 These exceptions to the
plain text of the Takings Clause have persisted, 
often, as the "back-
ground principles" that Lucas suggests are under 
a nuisance theory.
2. The Nuisance Exception
Just nineteen years before incorporation of the 
Takings Clause,
the Court had allowed a nuisance exception to 
the Takings Clause in
Mugler v. Kansas.'96 States may prohibit use of property 
that "will be
prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety 
of the public." 197
The state does not need to compensate for losses, 
because property
owners are inherently prohibited from harming 
society with a "nox-
ious use of their property."'
98 In its broadest terms, "[ilndividuals in
the enjoyment of their own rights must be careful not to injure 
the
rights of others."' 99 The state owes no compensation 
for regulations,
including regulation of nuisances: "In the one 
case, a nuisance only is
abated; in the other, unoffending property is 
taken away from an in-
nocent owner."2
00 Regardless of the validity of having a nuisance 
ex-
ception to the Takings Clause in the first place, 
an attempt to carve
out the necessity exception by means of the nuisance 
exception is, at
best, tenuous.
Courts and scholars have tried to join nuisance and necessity 
into
a single exception, arguing that "[allthough an inert building 
is ordi-
narily not a nuisance, when approached by a 
raging fire it can be said
to take on the characteristics of a tinder box, 
and thus poses a nui-
sance-like threat to other buildings."
201 Similarly, goods that an ap-
proaching enemy may take or property surrounding 
a blockaded
192 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 
101 U.S. 16, 18-19
(1879)).
193 Id.
194 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying 
text.
195 Sugameli, supra note 190, § 7.1(a).
196 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
197 Id. at 669.
198 Id.
199 The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5. How.) 504, 589 (1847) 
(McLean,J., dissenting)
200 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
201 DANA & MRLL, supra note 149, at 119-20.
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criminal may be extended by analogy to be considered a nuisance.
This analogy, however, proves too much. If a home in an increasingly-
crowded neighborhood would better serve the health of the commu-
nity as a park, that home becomes "a nuisance-like threat" to the com-
munity, because although the home is not actually injurious, the
community would be better off if it did not exist at all. The home
itself is not actually deleterious to the health of the community, but
the destruction of the home would benefit the community more. If
"nuisance" is so broadly defined for purposes of public necessity and
narrowly defined elsewhere, it loses credibility and becomes a doc-
trine that stretches and shrinks with convenience to evade the com-
pensation requirement of the Takings Clause.202
Furthermore, an actual nuisance must exist before the state can
control it; the potential for a nuisance is not enough. As one federal
court has held, "[T] he actual existence of a public nuisance is an abso-
lute condition precedent to the exercise of the power."20 3 A house
that has not yet caught fire, a flour barrel not yet captured by the
enemy, or a warehouse commandeered by a criminal are not "actual
nuisances," but potential nuisances or not nuisances at all.
The primary case cited in defense of the necessity-nuisance anal-
ogy is the Supreme Court case Miller v. Schoene.204 Virginia ordered
Miller to cut down cedar trees that might spread a disease to nearby
apple trees,2°5 though the disease did not diminish the value of the
cedars at all.20 6 The state defined the nuisance as keeping plants that
host communicable diseases within the radius of apple orchards po-
tentially harmed by that disease. 20 7 The Court agreed and quoted the
recent Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 2 0 8 opinion, which stated, "A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard."209 In Schoene, the Court found that
the disease was simply in the wrong place, so the state could destroy
the property without compensation. It refused to consider the
202 See Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv, 1, 50-51 (1971) ("Where the advantage ob-
tained from a mandatory expenditure is enjoyed primarily, if not exclusively, by per-
sons other than the one required to make it... the basic unfairness of the imposition
seems obvious.").
203 Miles v. Dist. of Columbia, 354 F. Supp. 577, 579-80 (D.D.C. 1973).
204 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
205 Id. at 277.
206 Id. at 278.
207 Id. at 279.
208 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
209 Id. at 388.
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"nicet[ies]" of common law nuisance or statutory regulation. 210 In-
stead, the Court invoked a necessity-like exception to defend this defi-
nition of a nuisance, and Schoene was often invoked in later case law
with an acceptance of this logic.2 11
The facts of Schoene do not match its broad construction or al-
leged sweeping terms. The Court noted that Miller could use the
felled trees. 212 The primary concern, instead, was the loss of scenic
value: "The evidence tends to show that the land is more valuable
without them; but, when properly trimmed and kept in order, they
possess, or are supposed to possess, a scenic value. "2 1 Unlike public
necessity destruction cases, the property in Schoene retained value and
had not been completely destroyed.
The analogies to nuisance and to Schoene inadequately explain
how the public necessity exception falls outside the scope of the Tak-
ings Clause. Nuisance, however, is not the only evasive jurisprudence
that tries to justify the public necessity exception in the face of the
text of the Constitution. A host of other conclusory statements con-
tinue to defend the public necessity privilege.
3. The Scope of the Takings Clause Exception
Courts have adopted several other arguments to distinguish tak-
ings from public necessity. First, some have limited the scope of the
Takings Clause to exercises of eminent domain.214 Eminent domain,
however, is not the sole procedure available for the government to
take property. Actions for inverse condemnation are allowed even
without the process of eminent domain, and these takings require
compensation.21 5 According to Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,2 1 6 a physical
invasion of land is a compensable taking, regardless of the govern-
210 Schoene, 276 U.S. at 280.
211 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992); id. at 1048
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-26 (1978); id. at 145 n.8 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
212 Schoene, 276 U.S. at 277. The Virginia Supreme Court had implied that the
owner was allowed to keep the lumber, which could be chopped for fence posts and
firewood. Miller v. State Entomologist, 135 S.E. 813, 818-19 (Va. 1926), affd sub nom.
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
213 Miller, 135 SE. at 814.
214 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIvmn 284 (2005) ("The takings clause was
originally about the power of eminent domain, a state's power to take property for a
fair market price and use it for public purposes.").
215 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
216 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
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ment's desire to take title. 217 Additionally, this philosophy undercuts
the premise of cases like Pennsylvania Coal and Lucas, where a com-
pensable taking exists where the regulation "goes too far. ' 218 Other
scholars agree: "Payment of compensation was the practice not only
when the government appropriated formal title to property, but also
when 'land was taken, used by the government, or damaged pursuant
to government authorization. "'2 1 9 Accordingly, many courts have not
restricted the scope of the Takings Clause to merely taking title.
Rather than restricting the Takings Clause, some courts have as-
serted that instances of necessity destruction are simply not within the
scope of the Fifth Amendment. These arguments read the public ne-
cessity privilege right out of the text of the Clause for various reasons,
none of which relate to the actual words of the Takings Clause. For
instance, Kent's oft-cited commentaries distinguish public necessity
from eminent domain, but he discusses the legal concepts together
because they so closely resemble each other.220 Dwarris's interpreta-
tion of the New York Constitution awkwardly tries to unify common
law with constitutional text.22' Even though the constitutional text is
clear enough and broad enough to require compensation for destruc-
tion, commentators try to escape the plain meaning of the text. The
Supreme Court's distinctions, particularly in the military necessity
context, have been just as awkward.
In Mitchell v. Harmony,222 the Mexican trader and United States
citizen Harmony had his "horses, mules, wagons, goods, chattels, and
merchandise" seized, and the army under Mitchell impressed his
workers.2 23 The Court held that "private property may lawfully be
taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from falling into the
hands of the public enemy," but emphasized, "[u]nquestionably, in
such cases, the government is bound to make full compensation to
the owner."2 24 The Court continued to hold this position in United
217 See id. at 176-78 (interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution's Takings Clause,
which the Court equates with that of the Federal Constitution); Rubenfeld, supra note
164, at 1083-85 (summarizing the physical-invasion aspect of takings).
218 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
219 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 149, at 17 (quoting John F. Hart, Colonial Land
Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. Rnv. 1252, 1284
(1996)).
220 See KENT, supra note 170, at *338-40.
221 See DWARRIS, supra note 78, at 445; supra note 175 and accompanying text.
222 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
223 Id. at 116.
224 Id. at 134.
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States v. Russell,2 25 where a steamer was seized and 
impressed for use,
but not appropriated, and later returned.
226 The Court continued its
inclusive definition of takings with decorative language regarding 
the
nature of necessity, and it held that property "impressed, 
appropri-
ated, or destroyed" by the government
227 required "full compensation
to the owner." 22 18 "[F] ull restitution" must be made if the 
situation is
so "imperative and immediate."
229 While one writer has described the
dicta of Mitchell and Russell to be a "guarantee,"
230 the Court did not
confront the actual situation of military destruction 
in a case of
necessity.
When the Court finally did face that situation, it hastily 
retreated
from its dicta. In United States v. Pacific Railroad,
231 the military sought
to prevent the Confederate advance into St. Louis 
during the Civil
War, and "some of the bridges were destroyed by 
[General Rosen-
crans's] orders, as a military necessity, to prevent the advance 
of the
enemy."23 2 Invoking a host of outside sources, including 
Vattel, the
maxim salus populi suprema lex, and Sparhawk,
233 the Court determined
that the discussion of "destruction" in Mitchell and 
Russell applied only
to compensation for property destroyed when the 
government made
use of the land.234 It described military necessity 
as outside the scope
of the Takings Clause, despite the fact that the 
military takings in
Mitchell and Russell explicitly required compensation 
because they were
takings for public use, seemingly within 
the scope of the Clause.
23 5
The Supreme Court continued to apply this logic 
in the second
half of the twentieth century. In United States v. Caltex,
236 the Army
destroyed Filipino petroleum products to prevent 
the advancing Japa-
nese from using the facilities.
2 37 Consistent with Pacific Railroad, the
Court noted that the "language in [Mitchell and Russell] is far 
broader
225 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871).
226 Id. at 631-32.
227 Id. at 628.
228 Id. at 629.
229 Id.
230 C. Wayne Owen, Jr., Note, Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: 
Does the Fifth Amend-
ment Mandate Compensation WVhen Property Is Damaged 
During the Course of Police Activi-
ties?, 9 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 277, 277, 290 
(2000).
231 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
232 Id. at 229.
233 Id. at 234-35.
234 Id. at 239-40.
235 United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628-29 
(1871); Mitchell v.
Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851).
236 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
237 Id. at 150-51.
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than the holdings." 238 The Court explained that it had not been ap-
propriate for public use, but that the property "was destroyed that the
United States might better and sooner destroy the enemy."2 39 The
Court nevertheless refused to compensate Caltex for its loss. It also
unhelpfully stated, "No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish
compensable losses from noncompensable losses, Each case must be
judged on its own facts."2 40 A complete destruction of property, then,
had no categorical protection under the Takings Clause.
In YMCA v. United States,24 1 the Court continued to apply this
standard, again to the chagrin of Justices Black and Douglas. Riots
took protestors to the YMCA Building and the Masonic Temple in
Panama, where army troops barricaded themselves inside the
YMCA.2 42 The alleged goal of the mission was to remove the rioters
from the Canal Zone, not to protect the businesses.243 From the facts,
however, the Court found that the troops were actually protecting the
buildings, and not the Zone.24 4 Stipulated facts stated the army's
command, which included "instructions to protect the property."2 45
The Court emphasized that because "the private party [was] the par-
ticular intended beneficiary of the governmental activity, 'fairness and
justice' [did] not require that losses which may result from that activ-
ity 'be borne by the public as a whole,' even though the activity may
also be intended incidentally to benefit the public."2 46 The justifica-
tion of Caltex again applied here, though the YMCA stood to benefit
directly from government intervention.
The result in YMCA, however, should not be overstated because
of the proximity of the benefit. In fact, Justice Stewart concurred to
emphasize that "[i]f United States military forces should use a build-
ing for their own purposes-as a defense bastion or command post,
for example-it seems to me this would be a Fifth Amendment taking,
even though the owner himself were not actually deprived of any per-
238 Id. at 153.
239 Id. at 155. Justice Douglas seized upon this language in his dissent, which was
joined by Justice Black, and described the destruction as "necessary to help win the
war." Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The destruction, he notes, "deprived the
enemy of a valuable logistic weapon." Id.
240 Id. at 156 (majority opinion).
241 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
242 Id. at 87-88.
243 Id. at 87, 90.
244 Id. at 90.
245 Id. at 91 (emphasis omitted) (quoting a fact sheet from the General Counsel of
the U.S. Department of the Army, to which the parties stipulated).
246 Id. at 92 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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sonal use of the building. ' 2 47 Justice Harlan went further and con-
curred in the result only, reflecting that if the military destroyed the
building to stop the rioters,
it would be difficult indeed to call the building's owner the 'particu-
lar intended beneficiary' of the Government's action. Nevertheless,
if the military reasonably believed that the rioters would have
burned the building anyway, recovery should be denied for the
same reasons it is properly denied in the case before us. 2 4 8
The holding of Caltex continued to control the Court's analysis, and
the government's use of the property seemed more important than its
seizure of the property.249
The Court readily accepted a distinction between a compensable
destruction and a noncompensable destruction exclusively on the ba-
sis of a historical exception. It continued to stack precedent against a
compensation requirement and distinguished destruction from use of
the property. Without regard to the text of the Clause or the princi-
ple of "fairness and justice," the Court flatly determined that this kind
of destruction did not require compensation. This history doomed
compensation for military destruction, and it collided with the Tak-
ings Clause, resulting in the generic exclusion of the police power.
4. The Police Power Exception
Last among interpretive techniques that seek to justify excluding
necessity from compensable takings, courts have articulated the posi-
tion that the exercise of the police power is not a taking. The argu-
ment is similar to the nuisance analogy, but it more generally
encompasses the state's police power role. Defining the police power,
however, has been a confusing body of law that unsuccessfully at-
tempts to compartmentalize the necessity privilege.
Ernst Freund's treatise on the police power and the Constitution
tries to distinguish eminent domain from the police power. He writes,
"If we differentiate eminent domain and police power as distinct pow-
ers of government, the difference lies neither in the form nor in the
purpose of taking, but in the relation which the property affected
bears to the danger or evil which is to be provided against." 250 Freund
distinguishes property that the public uses to create a positive value,
which would fall under eminent domain, and property that the public
247 Id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
248 Id. at 97 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
249 Justice Black dissented with Justice Douglas and echoed Douglas's concerns set
forth in his Caltex dissent. Id. at 97 (Black, J., dissenting).
250 ERNsT FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546 (1904).
[VOL. 82:1
1 AS MUCH UPON TRADITION AS UPON PRINCIPLE"
does not use but prevents from generating a negative value, which
would fall under the police power.25 1 He concludes that the commu-
nity should be liable in cases of necessity,25 2 but the common law did
"not afford an adequate remedy in cases of sudden and extraordinary
emergency. "253 The common law did not provide justice to injured
property owners who could not recover compensation. He concedes
that war could create "constitutional anomalies."254 This discussion,
however, does not address the actual text of the Constitution, and
Freund fails to explain adequately the distinction between a taking
and a complete destruction of property for public use merely classi-
fied under the police power.
The Texas Supreme Court has indicated that the police power
covers actions during "impending peril."2 55 It analyzed eminent do-
main and the police power, then held, "[t]he one can await the forms
and tardiness of the law; the other is governed by a necessity which
knows no law. Delay in the latter case may be certain destruction."256
The rationale here suggests that if something is important or urgent
enough, the state acts with the police power and compensation is not
required. Again, this analysis runs afoul of the Supreme Court's own
analysis in cases like Pumpelly or the military seizure cases, where an
inadvertent physical invasion of property needed for war still requires
compensation.
Furthermore, the Lucas Court emphasized that compensation no
longer hinged upon this harm-benefit balancing test. Justice Scalia
wrote, "[Tlbe distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-con-
ferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder." 25 7 He re-
marked that many regulations could be classified both ways, so the
distinction is unhelpful.258 Instead, categorical rules for takings are
preferred, particularly when the classification can be drawn either
way. In the necessity cases, the destructions can easily be classified as
both harm-preventing and benefit-conferring. The destruction of a
home in the path of a fire prevents the further harm of an advancing
fire, but creates the benefit of a fire break that did not naturally exist;
the destruction of property that the approaching enemy may use pre-
vents the future harm of a sustained enemy attack, but creates the
251 Id. at 546-47.
252 Id. at 564-65.
253 Id. at 564.
254 Id. at 565-66.
255 Keller v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614, 627-28 (Tex. 1879).
256 Id.
257 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992).
258 Id. at 1024-25.
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benefit of strategic military action against the enemy; the destruction
of property surrounding a criminal prevents the harm that the crimi-
nal on the loose may cause, but it benefits society in contributing to
the capture of the criminal. In each situation the "eye of the be-
holder" creates an unworkable framework for the police power
definition.
The consensus among contemporary legal scholars has been to
accept this privilege without much question and to move on without
much explanation. David Dana and Thomas Merrill, for example, re-
fuse to dissect the definition of the police power as it relates to neces-
sity and choose instead to accept the Bowditch decision as
authoritative. They write that "it has been around for a long time, has
never been questioned, and has been characterized as falling squarely
within the state's police power."259 Quite simply, the exception exists
and does not require compensation, regardless of how that exception
is reached. Justice Holmes's comment that this area of law is deter-
mined "as much upon tradition as upon principle" continues to con-
trol how courts interpret the text of the Constitution.
III. A MArTER OF POLICY
The Constitution may not support the common law privilege of
necessity destruction, but the exception arose because of a variety of
policy concerns. Those policy concerns have been overstated, and
they ignore the modern shift toward compensating any taking of
property when the sovereign previously owed no such obligation. The
most fascinating parallel to the doctrine of necessity, however, is the
maritime law of general average, which does require compensation
for property destroyed during necessity on the sea.
A. General Average
The law of general average exists in the oft-ignored body of mari-
time law. It is older than even Roman law and first came from
Rhodes.26 0 If sailors must lighten a ship in times of emergency, then
all parties to the voyage contribute to compensate for the loss of the
cargo.26' This principle matches the principle behind compensation
for takings, except that it is limited to necessity on the sea: "What is
given, or sacrificed, in time of danger, for the sake of all, is to be
replaced by a general contribution on the part of all who have been
259 DANA & MERJILL, supra note 149, at 120.
260 RICHARD LOWNDES, THE LAW OF GENERAL AVRAGE I (Edward L. de Hart &
George Rupert Rudolf eds., 6th ed. 1922).
261 Id.
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thereby brought to safety."2 62 The destruction of property in a time of
necessity yields compensation for the injured property owner on the
sea, but not on land.
The sacrifice is not limited to the jettison of cargo, but includes
the sacrifice of portions of the ship and even other "extraordinary ex-
penses."263 The loss, and subsequently the appropriate share of the
compensation, "must be borne proportionably [sic] by all who are in-
terested." 264 Despite its pejorative definition as "peculiar commu-
nism,"2 65 its application has never been seriously questioned for two
millennia. The American law of general average has four particular
requirements:
First, the sacrifice or expenditure has to be "extraordinary"; sec-
ondly, it has to be "voluntarily and reasonably" made; thirdly, it has
to be incurred in time of "peril;" and finally, the sacrifice or expen-
diture has to be incurred for the purpose of preserving the property
"imperilled [sic] in the common adventure."266
The "voluntariness" requirement excludes compensation for losses to
pirates or the weather. The loss must also benefit the "common ad-
venture," a requirement that ostensibly matches "public use."
In land-based cases of public necessity, the four American ele-
ments of general average all apply. The loss is "extraordinary" and in
a time of "peril," because the loss is the total destruction of property
in a time of urgent necessity. The loss is "voluntary" because it has
been caused by an individual and not by the natural events them-
selves. Finally, the loss is for the "common adventure," because the
loss occurs to benefit the entire public.
The "common adventure" element does not appear to fit as
neatly into the analytical framework, because on a ship it is easy to
determine the number of the parties and the size of the benefit. In
the case of a fire, though, the community undoubtedly benefits, but
the number and the size are more difficult to determine. One recom-
mendation suggests that the compensation should "be raised either
from the municipality at large, or from the specific district at risk by
262 Id.
263 The Star of Hope, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 203, 228 (1869); LowNDEs, supra note 260,
at 20.
264 LOWNDES, supra note 260, at 21 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Birkley v.
Presgrave, (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 86, 89 (K-B.) (Lawrence, J.)).
265 Id. at 1.
266 SUSAN HODGES, LAw OF MARINE INSURANCE 439 (1996) (quoting Marine Insur-
ance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 41, § 66(2) (Eng.)).
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the fire, if that district is definable
-
"
2 67 This principle is the most pre-
cise when determining the scope of compensation 
for acts committed
by a private individual or a municipal officer 
in cases of natural disas-
ter. The municipality threatened should compensate 
the individual,
or, if the benefit is determined to have a more 
limited and defined
scope, then just the benefited district should contribute. 
In cases
where either the state or federal governments 
act, the benefit extends
to the jurisdiction of the actor, and the state or federal 
government
should compensate.
The size of the benefit is easily calculable 
for passengers on a
ship, because the precise value of their 
goods is determinable from
the record of the ship's cargo and the 
market prices of the goods
when they leave port. In a community, 
the size of the benefit has
never been an important calculus for compensation 
for takings, be-
cause general principles of taxation apply 
to compensation for prop-
erty taken for the public use.
Commentators have argued that the measure 
for compensation
for destruction in times of necessity should 
be based "on the principle
of maritime general average."
2 68 Their arguments have been largely
ignored. Indeed, the expansion of general 
average into any similar
area of the common law has been resisted, 
and "there is no authority
at common law for extending it to property 
not engaged in a common
maritime adventure in the nature of a voyage."
269 One English case
refused to extend general average to railroads, 
despite the argument
that "the carriage on board the ship and 
the carriage by railway are
linked together."2 7
0 Another commentator argued "that the doctrine
of general average will not be extended to 
aircraft,"2 7 I and the idea of
applying it to losses caused in stopping the 
spread of fire "has never
been entertained."
2 72
Those who hold such hostility to expansion 
do not consider the
merit of giving compensation to property 
owners who lost property
for the sake of the greater good. The contemporary 
justification for
general average remains elusive. The principle 
behind its application
has been seen as a form of "natural justice," arising from 
an implicit
267 Henry C. Hall & John H. Wigmore, Compensation 
for Property Destroyed to Stop the
Spread of a Conflagration, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 501, 522 (1907).
268 Id.
269 See LowNoES, supra note 260, at 53.
270 Crooks & Co. v. Allan, (1879) 5 Q.B.D. 38, 40.
271 J.F. DONALDSON & C.T. ELLIS, LOWNDES & 
RUDOLF'S LAW OF GENERAL AVERAGE
AND THE YoRK
- ANTAERP RuLEs 26 (8th ed. 1955).
272 Id.
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contract when the parties engage in a joint venture on the sea.273
Lord Justice Bowen emphasized that under
[t]he maritime law, for the purposes of public policy and for the
advantage of trade, imposes in these cases a liability upon the thing
saved, a liability which is a special consequence arising out of the
character of mercantile enterprises, the nature of sea perils, and the
fact that the thing saved was saved under great stress and excep-
tional circumstances. No similar doctrine applies to things lost
upon land, nor to anything except ships or goods in peril at sea. 27 4
If these are the policy reasons behind general average, then they
ought also to apply in common law for public necessity. The injured
property owners are identically harmed on land or at sea. Their prop-
erty, which would otherwise inevitably be lost, has been sacrificed for
the good of the community. The loss occurs under exceptional cir-
cumstances. The statement that "sea perils" require a unique form of
compensation is as vacuous an explanation as stating that the wooden
frames of most houses make them particularly vulnerable to fires.
Unique to maritime law is the "character of mercantile enter-
prises. ''27 5 During the sea voyage, all the parties on the ship seek the
common preservation of merchandise for a safe passage on the water.
The parties have a common interest in preserving their cargo, and so
they should pay when one party's cargo is sacrificed to save the rest.
In a similar manner, though not as tightly analogous, each community
member shares with all others a collective interest in the preservation
of property in the community.
While general average law supports the application of the princi-
ple to necessity destruction takings, it does not solve the problem of
Mouse's Case.27 6 Mouse brought suit for the jettison of cargo on a
river, but the court refused to hold the destroyer liable. To assume
that maritime law did not apply on the river where the episode took
place is probably incorrect, because a barge was able to navigate the
river and it therefore fell under the maritime jurisdiction of navigable
waterways. 2 77 The application of the public necessity exception, how-
ever, does not explain why the law of general average did not apply.
273 Id. at 20-26; LOWNDES, supra note 260, at 28.
274 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234, 248-49 (Bowen, Lord
J.).
275 Id.
276 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
277 But see Frederick B. Sussmann, The Defence of Private Necessity and the Problem of
Compensation, 2 OTTAWA L. REv. 184, 191 n.37 (1967) (stating that the law of general
average did not apply to Mouse's Case because the episode took place on a river).
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Because Mouse did not bring suit for general average against the
entire ship, but only a suit against a single actor, the court could not
apply general average. While Mouse had "a right to contributions to-
wards his loss from those whose property is saved," he could not bring
a claim against the magister navis, the actor, or any individual.2 7 The
injured property owner could not request compensation from a single
individual but could only receive a remedy through the law of general
average, and receive a contribution from all. Even "though nothing
was there said about general average contributions, there can be little
doubt that if the jettison for the general safety has been lawful, the
rule of contribution applies, however it was made."279 Despite the fact
that Mouse's Case is the preeminent case that justifies no compensa-
tion, Mouse would be compensated under a parallel theory of law,
only because the destruction took place on a boat.
Several scholars have advocated some kind of application of gen-
eral average to cases of necessity. Vattel compares eminent domain to
general average, holding, "The same rules are applicable to this case
as to the loss of merchandise thrown overboard to save the vessel." 280
Dwarris also admits, "In Marine losses of this nature the common law
has been able to establish a just rule of compensation and assessment;
and the same principle, so far as it is possible to apply it, would be
equally equitable in similar losses by land."28' The policy considera-
tions behind general average and the very application of the law are
lucid, categorical, and uniformly applicable.
American courts have not read the law of maritime average with
such a jaundiced eye as to classify it a "peculiar communism;" indeed,
the Supreme Court has approvingly called it "[c)ommon justice. '" 28 2
While the Court has classified the voyage as a "sea risk," the Court
nevertheless allows reimbursement if a party "makes a sacrifice to
avoid the impending danger or incurs extraordinary expenses to pro-
mote the general safety." 283 The broader policy of "fairness and jus-
tice" articulated by the American courts suggests that justice demands
compensation for destructions of property that benefit the public. As
one article asked, "The common law, from the very beginning, justi-
fied the trespass for the private citizen who acted for the community;
why, then, should not the community reimburse in such cases
278 THOMAS GILBERT CARVER, A TREATISE ON T14E LAW RELATING TO THE CARRIAGE
OF GooDs BY SEA § 15, at 18 (James S. Henderson ed., 7th ed. 1925).
279 Id. § 374, at 531.
280 VATTEL, supra note 47, at 112.
281 DWARRis, supra note 78, at 449 (footnote omitted).
282 The Star of Hope, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 203, 228 (1869).
283 Id.
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also?"28 4 If bad history and poor constitutional interpretation can no
longer prevent compensation, some other policy concern must be of-
fered to block the exercise of "common justice."
B. A Consistent Approach to Takings
Because the privilege of necessity does not fit the actual text of
the Constitution, the policy behind the Takings Clause, the traditional
exercise of the police power, or its maritime counterpart, the only
remaining basis for preserving the privilege lies in general policy con-
siderations. Defenders of the privilege insist that certain policy bene-
fits outweigh the harm caused to property owners. Even these policy
reasons, free from the constraints of constitutional interpretation, fail
to justify adherence to this privilege in light of the great losses borne
by citizens for the public's benefit.
Attempted policy justifications of the privilege overwhelmingly re-
ject concern for the injured property owner. As a matter of policy,
this rejection is fundamentally contrary to the values of the early com-
mon law philosophers and the nation's Founders. The Takings
Clause reflected a new concern for individual rights, and in particular
property rights, during the founding era.28 5 The "inviolability of
property" became a valuable part of American legal policy.286 As Wil-
liam Michael Treanor states, the Takings Clause "inculcated the belief
that an uncompensated taking was a violation of a fundamental
right."287 If compensation for injured property owners is the primary
policy concern in the United States, the policy behind the necessity
privilege must overcome this concern.
First, some argue that the privilege ensures that swift action will
be taken in times of necessity. If individuals are concerned with liabil-
ity, "they may not act with the requisite dispatch to avert a larger disas-
ter."288 Without the spectre of liability, individuals will act in the best
interest of the community.
The "swift action" theory has no historical support and does not
correctly consider the role of compensation in takings. The only his-
torical example of hesitation for liability is the Great Fire of London
of 1666, a myth previously debunked.2 89 Additionally, if the public
284 Hall & Wigmore, supra note 267, at 521.
285 Treanor, supra note 154, at 701.
286 Id. at 712 (citingJames Madison, Property, in 14 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON
266, 267 (R. Rutland & T. Mason eds., 1983)).
287 Id. at 714.
288 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 149, at 120 (citing Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S.
(1 Dall.) 357, 363 (Pa. 1788)).
289 See supra Part I.A.3.
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pays the compensation to the individuals harmed, then the actors
bear no personal liability, and the incentive to act remains the same.
While public officials may fear the wrath of an electorate who will hold
them accountable for payments for compensation for destroyed prop-
erty, the electorate would presumably be more upset with a public
official who failed to prevent the spread of disaster in a time of need.
Second, the theory of ex ante compensation suggests that prop-
erty owners benefit from lower insurance rates if individuals are per-
mitted to destroy property for the benefit of the public. This
justification would only apply to public necessity relating to natural
disaster, because homeowners do not insure against acts of the mili-
tary or the police. Dana and Merrill explain, "The practice of al-
lowing the government to destroy buildings in the path of fire
significantly reduces the total amount of destruction caused by cata-
strophic fires. All owners thus receive implicit compensation in the
form of reduced insurance rates for giving up the right to ex post
compensation." 29 Property owners receive a benefit before destruc-
tion occurs, so the economic benefit is distributed according to the
economic risk of harm.
The ex ante theory assumes that all individuals have insurance
and still leaves property owners without compensation for their losses.
Not everyone purchases adequate insurance, so property owners may
still be injured more than the economic benefit received. 291 Addition-
ally, insurance companies will reimburse the homeowner for natural
harm but not for destruction committed by the state. The home-
owner has received the benefit of nominally lower insurance rates be-
cause the city may destroy property and lessen the risk of fire, but the
homeowner would be in a better position if his home were destroyed
by the fire. 292 Homeowners in the same situation receive radically dif-
ferent compensation depending on the cause of the destruction.
While everyone receives the same benefit of lower insurance, only
some receive compensation for destroyed property. Similarly-injured
property owners should receive similar compensation for their
injuries.
Third, an argument related to ex ante compensation is the causa-
tion argument. It states that "[ijf the claimant's property would have
been engulfed by fire in any event, then the government's interven-
tion should not be regarded as the cause of its demise." 293 Freund
290 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 149, at 119.
291 Hall & Wigmore, supra note 267, at 523.
292 Id. at 506.
293 DANA & MEMRLL, supra note 149, at 119.
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insists, "Of course there can be no constitutional or moral duty of
compensation, where the property destroyed could not have been
saved in any event. '294 Another defense of the theory argues "that in
such a case the party has virtually made no sacrifice at all for the com-
munity."295 The causation argument leaves homeowners in the same
position as the ex ante compensation theory does. Among identically
injured property owners, some would be compensated by insurance
while others would not. Injured property owners would again have no
source of compensation.
Finally, the valueless property theory states that because the prop-
erty is valueless just before destruction, compensation is not required.
A home approached by fire, a sack of flour about to be seized by the
enemy, and a structure barricaded by a criminal all seem to be worth-
less at the moment they are destroyed, because they are in imminent
peril. Dana and Merrill argue that "the government's intervention
should not be regarded as the cause of its demise." 296 Judge Posner
has mused, "[Tllhere would always be the question whether, given the
approaching fire, the house that was pulled down to create a firebreak
had any positive market value at the instant before it was damaged."2 97
The intervening cause of government action, then, harms only value-
less property.
This theory, however, ignores the need for compensation for
goods destroyed exclusively by the government's action and again
leaves the property owner without a remedy. In cases like Bowditch,
the property owner may seek compensation for property that he could
have removed from harm before the disaster hit.298 Also, the property
owner again has no remedy through insurance, because imperiled
property does possess a value: the amount of compensation that an
insurance company would pay for the loss.
CONCLUSION
None of the policy justifications for the privilege of necessity de-
struction can stand against the "fairness and justice" principle that
property owners harmed to benefit the public should receive compen-
sation. It is somewhat ironic, then, thatJustice Scalia's opinion in Lu-
cas has been described as "characteristically hard-edged, looking for a
294 FREUND, supra note 250, at 565.
295 Hall & Wigmore, supra note 267, at 506.
296 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 149, at 119.
297 Warner/Elektra/Atlantic Corp. v. County of DuPage, 991 F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th
Cir. 1993).
298 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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rule courts could apply rather than invoking a balancing 
test, seeking
some rule that could be applied 'on an 
objective, value-free basis.' 2 99
It is his opinion that continued to protect the necessity 
privilege from
examination under the Takings Clause. The text, 
history, and policy
of the Fifth Amendment cannot support the continued 
exception of
this privilege. Citizens like Mr. Strickland ought not 
bear property
losses that benefit the public as a whole. It is time 
to shift this "tradi-
tion" to a "principled" application: compensation 
should be granted
to injured property owners whose property has been destroyed 
in
times of public necessity.
299 TuSHNET, supra note 214, at 289.
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